C 3. Pravica do ZASEBNOSTI in ZAUPNOSTI- 3 TAXPAYER RIGHTS

C 3. Pravica do ZASEBNOSTI in ZAUPNOSTI- 3 TAXPAYER RIGHTS

Uvod:

V Sloveniji se načelo najpogosteje krši zaradi javne objave t.i. davčnih dolžnikov  (poleg nesorazmernega zbiranja bančnih in drugih podatkov o plačnikih davkov preko določil ZDavP-2, ki urejajo pridobivanje podatkov), saj se objavijo tudi zadeve, ki niso pravnomočno zaključene. 

Prav tako se načelo krši v primerih, ko se nesorazmerno predajajo dokumenti zavezancev v postopkih, ko se upravni postopki nadaljujejo v t.i. kazenskih postopkih (stranka ni poučena o njenih pravicah). 

Prav tako se načelo krši v primerih mednarodnih izmenjavah podatkov, saj v Sloveniji ni presoje o sorazmernosti ukrepov.Glej Van Weerelt v. the Netherlands (3rd Section, Application No. 784/14, 16 June 2015) . Po odločitvi danskega sodišča, lahko zavezanec zahteva podatke, pridobljene v mednarodni izmenjavi preko rednih sodnih postopkov (str, 92, 4.9.4. Mutual agreement procedure, IBFD 2015-2017 General Report on the Protection of Taxpayers’ Rights)

Seveda pa je načelo kršeno tudi v primerih, ko organ nesorazmerno poizveduje o strankah pri drugih strankah oz. drugih plačnikih davkov . 

Ureditev, po kateri se vsi bančni podatki o vseh plačnikih davkov, nesorazmerno predajajo davčnemu organu, je vprašljiva tudi z vidika sodb sodišč iz področij človekovih pravic (Glej sodbo M.N. and others v. San Marino (3rd Section, Application No. 28005/12, 7 July 2015).

"Zaseg v smislu kopiranja bančnih podatkov (pridobljenih iz bančnih izpiskov, čekov, zaupnih dispozicij in e-poštnih sporočil), za katere Sodišče meni, da spadajo pod pojem "zasebno življenje" in "dopisovanje" ter poznejše shranjevanje pristojnih organov teh podatkov pomeni poseg v namene člena 8 EKČP"

V   primeru Nemčije je bil leta 2016 spremenjen zakon,  ki zajema  obveznosti  tretjih oseb, da  zbirajo  informacije  za  davčne namene in ga posreduje davčnim  organom v elektronski obliki. (Glej poročilo IBFD) V skladu  s  temi spremembami morajo zavarovalnice zagotoviti informacije o prispevkih davkoplačevalcev.

Vendar je bilo  varstvo pravic davkoplačevalcev izboljšano, vključno s  tem, da:

(i)  tretje osebe lahko uporabijo informacije, ki so bile zbrane izključno za potrebe posredovanja davčnim organom, razen če zakon določa drugače;

(ii)  delodajalci, ki so dolžni plačati davek po odbitku– ki  lahko vključujejo cerkveni  davek – na plače,  lahko uporabijo informacije o članstvu verske skupine samo za namen davčnega odtegljaja,  in  enako velja za banke in druge tretje osebe, ki morajo plačati davek po odbitku na dohodek od  kapitala;

(iii) v vsakem primeru morajo tretje osebe obvestiti davkoplačevalce o informacijah, poslanih davčnim organom; in 

(IV)  tretje osebe ne posredujejo  informacij , če ugotovijo, da so morale posredovati  informacije že  7 let po koncu proračunskega  leta.

Povezava na zakon: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_ao/englisch_ao.html

V Nemčiji davčni inšpektorji poročajo PLAČNIKU DAVKA o vseh dejstvih tudi v primeru, ko in če sodelujejo v t.i. čezmejnih nadzorih, kjer zasledijo vse podatke v zvezi s konkretnim plačnikom davkov (Glej IBFD, str 69; https://www.ibfd.org/sites/ibfd.org/files/content/pdf/OPTR_General-Report.pdf).

Kako razumejo načelo pravičnosti sistema na Nizozemskem v delu, kjer obravnavajo pravico davčnega svetovalca do ne-razkrivanja podatkov davčni upravi o svojih klientih?

Na Nizozemskem nimajo urejenega davčnega svetovanja v zakonih, toda njihova sodna praksa je jasno določila, da je davčno svetovanje ključnega pomena za t.i. pošten davčni sistem (načelo demokratičnosti, pravičnosti, enakopravne obravnave itd.), ko se mora plačnik davka boriti z močno državo. 

In an obiter consideration (a right of non-disclosure), the Supreme Court concluded (In its judgement of 23 September 2005, BNB2006/21,):

“Because the first question is also of importance with regard to other disputes, it is noted that the principle of fair play, which is one of the general principles of sound administration, is incompatible with an inspector making use of the authority granted to him under Article 47 AWR to obtain reports and other documents prepared by third partiesinsofar as they outline the taxpayer’s taxposition or advise the taxpayer thereon. This consideration also applies tothose parts of the documents that contain information of a factual or descriptive nature for that purpose. The remaining parts (which were not prepared for that purpose) must be provided, upon request, for which it may be necessary to split or edit the documents.”

....

 Amsterdam District Court ruling of 6 October 2011, LJN BT6955.......The preliminary relief judge also concludedthat the responsibility fordetermining which documents have to be provided to the tax authorities lies with the holder of the confidential information, and that the tax authoritiesmay not challenge this decision.

Kako rešujejo druge države načelo proporcionalnosti pri zahtevanju podatkov zavezancev?

Principle of proportionality

– Canadian courts have overruled the general powers of the tax administration to have unrestricted access to the tax accrual working papers of the taxpayer.

- Serbia has regulated proportionality in tax matters in line with the doctrine of the ECHR. Audits are based on risk assessment and are proportionate to the estimated risk.

- The Serbian tax authority is bound to collect information that is in the possession of other state authorities by itself.

- Spain’s tax administration has proposed to adopt measures to require taxpayers to file all transactions that may lead to double non-taxation, with no standards for qualification of such operations.

- Turkey has enacted legislation limiting the powers of the tax administration in tax audits.

Kako razume načelo kanadska davčna administracija?

Kako varujejo zasebnost v Kanadi - sodna praksa (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2797381)?

For example, we follow government-wide and internal policies on the security of information and privacy. We also regularly review our internal processes to make sure your information is safe.”

Tax information inherently includes the sort of highly personal information in regard to which individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 45 This includes family composition,46 health circumstances,47 religious and political affiliations,48 and other aspects of one’s personal life and relationships. Much of this information is sensitive and many individuals would feel vulnerable to embarrassment or harassment if others could view it, whether in an official capacity or otherwise.49 Individuals thus acquiesce to sharing personal information with the government for a specific purpose, namely, the administration of the tax system. This acquiescence is widely understood to create a trust relationship between the individual and the government.50 

Canadian jurisprudence has developed doctrines regarding the expectations of privacy and rights to due process when the use of information begins as a matter of tax administration and transforms into investigation of potentially criminal offenses. In a recent study of taxpayer rights in Canada, Salvatore Mirandola and Sergio Privato explained the altering expectation and rights as following from the shift from the “regulatory sphere” of routine tax administration to the “penal sphere” of criminal investigation.51 The authors note that “[i]n the regulatory sphere, the Supreme Court of Canada has determined that taxpayers have relatively low reasonable expectations of privacy. In the penal sphere, taxpayers are provided with more rigorous protection by Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the CRA is much more constrained in its powers. The Supreme Court of Canada has provided guidelines to assess whether, as a matter of fact, the CRA is performing regulatory functions or penal functions in a particular case.”52 

The Supreme Court of Canada has articulated the principles for expectations and rights as follows: 

“…when the state seeks information, not in the course of regulating a lawful social or business activity, but in the course of investigating a criminal offence …[f]or reasons that go to the very core of our legal tradition, it is generally accepted that the citizen has a very high expectation of privacy in respect of such investigations. The suspicion cast on persons who are made the subject of a criminal investigation can seriously, and perhaps permanently, lower their standing in the community. This alone would entitle the citizen to expect that his or her privacy would be invaded only when the state has shown that it has serious grounds to suspect guilt. This expectation is strengthened by virtue of the central position of the presumption of innocence in our criminal law. The stigma inherent in a criminal investigation requires that those who are innocent of wrongdoing be protected against overzealous or reckless use of the powers of search and seizure by those responsible for the enforcement of the criminal law. The requirement of a warrant, based on a showing of reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed and evidence relevant to its investigation will be obtained, is designed to provide this protection.”53 

In voluntarily furnishing personal information to the state, an individual may be viewed as having waived certain of her rights, including for example the general right against selfincrimination. A legislated right to remain silent may not be available to an individual in respect of information already disclosed to the government in the form of a tax return. However, waiving a right for one purpose (tax administration) does not necessarily constitute the waiver of the right for all purposes (for example, enforcement of criminal law). 54 Preserving confidentiality of tax information even after the taxpayer has voluntarily furnished it to the government is generally viewed as necessary to avoid creating a situation in which the threat of detection under one set of laws pressures the individual to violate another. Were it otherwise, individuals involved in the kinds of criminal activity that would be evident from inspection of a tax return would have their fundamental rights against self-incrimination compromised in ways not applicable to individuals involved in criminal activity that were not revealed in their tax information. The former would be forced into engaging in annual acts of self-incrimination by virtue of annually fulfilling tax requirements, or pressured to annually violate the tax laws in order to preserve the right against self-incrimination in the commission of a different crime. The latter would face no similar systemic threat to their right against self-incrimination; neither would they be systemically pressured to commit offenses against the tax laws.