OD ŠKODLJIVE DAVČNE KONKURENCE DO ETIČNIH DAVČNIH SISTEMOV EU-27

Kritična analiza Kodeksa ravnanja z vidika dobrega upravljanja, človekovih pravic ter 41. in 51. člena Listine EU

Predsedovanje Tine Humar kot priložnost za evropski forum poštenih davčnih sistemov in direktivo o pravicah plačnikov davkov

 

Avtor: mag. Franc Derganc, www.modro-poslovanje.si; Analitični del je izvedel »AI TAXIN« – agent za davčno pravo

 

Prevod v angleški jezik: Kliknite tukaj

 

 

I. UVOD

1. KODEKS NI OSTAL ZGOLJ POLITIČNA DEKLARACIJA: TRIJE KONKRETNI REZULTATI

 

Kodeks ravnanja na področju podjetniškega obdavčevanja je politična in medvladna zaveza držav članic Evropske unije, namenjena prepoznavanju, presoji in odpravljanju davčnih ukrepov, ki lahko povzročajo škodljivo davčno konkurenco ali zmanjšujejo davčne osnove drugih držav.

Prvotni Kodeks so Svet Evropske unije in predstavniki vlad držav članic, ki so se sestali v okviru Sveta, sprejeli z resolucijo 1. decembra 1997. Objavljen je bil 6. januarja 1998 v Uradnem listu Evropskih skupnosti C 2, na straneh od 2 do 5; uradno besedilo prvotnega Kodeksa je dostopno na EUR-Lexu. Svet je 8. novembra 2022 odobril prvo celovito revizijo Kodeksa po letu 1997, s katero je bilo področje presoje razširjeno s preferenčnih davčnih režimov tudi na nekatere splošno veljavne značilnosti nacionalnih davčnih sistemov. Revidirano besedilo je bilo objavljeno 15. novembra 2022 v Uradnem listu Evropske unije C 433, na straneh od 1 do 5; uradno slovensko besedilo revidiranega Kodeksa je dostopno na EUR-Lexu, pri čemer je novi Kodeks prvotnega nadomestil 1. januarja 2023, pravila o splošnih davčnih značilnostih pa se uporabljajo od 1. januarja 2024.

Revidirani kodeks ravnanja na področju podjetniškega obdavčevanja je politični in medvladni instrument, vendar njegovega pomena ne smemo podcenjevati.

Svet EU navaja, da je bilo od začetka delovanja mehanizma v Evropski uniji odpravljenih približno 140 škodljivih davčnih praks. (7) Pravno sicer ne bi bilo pravilno vseh teh rezultatov pripisati izključno Evropski komisiji: Skupina za kodeks ravnanja identificira in ocenjuje ukrepe, Komisija pripravlja tehnične analize, države članice sprejemajo politične ugotovitve, nacionalni zakonodajalci pa morajo nato svoje ureditve spremeniti. V nekaterih najpomembnejših primerih je Komisija politične ugotovitve Skupine podprla še z uporabo zavezujočih pravil EU o državnih pomočeh. Prav ta povezava med mehkim pravom Kodeksa in pravno zavezujočimi pristojnostmi Komisije je omogočila, da se je politična presoja spremenila v dejanski rezultat.

1.1 Belgijski koordinacijski centri

Belgija je od leta 1982 uporabljala poseben davčni režim za koordinacijske centre mednarodnih skupin, ki so za povezane družbe opravljali finančne, upravljavske in podporne funkcije. Skupina za kodeks ravnanja je belgijski režim označila kot škodljiv davčni ukrep A 001, Komisija pa ga je nato preučila tudi po pravilih o državnih pomočeh. (8) Komisija je 17. februarja 2003 ugotovila, da režim koordinacijskim centrom zagotavlja selektivne davčne ugodnosti in pomeni državno pomoč, ki ni združljiva s skupnim trgom. Belgiji je naložila, naj režim odpravi ali ga spremeni tako, da bo skladen s pravom EU. Od vročitve odločbe ugodnosti ni bilo več dovoljeno dodeljevati novim upravičencem ali jih ohranjati s podaljševanjem obstoječih dovoljenj. Obstoječi upravičenci so lahko zaradi varstva legitimnih pričakovanj režim uporabljali samo do izteka individualnega dovoljenja in najpozneje do 31. decembra 2010. (8) Rezultat je bil postopni konec enega najbolj prepoznavnih evropskih preferenčnih režimov za dejavnosti mednarodnih skupin. Primer hkrati kaže, da Komisija rezultata ni dosegla samo s Kodeksom, temveč predvsem s povezavo politične ocene Skupine in svoje zavezujoče pristojnosti na področju državnih pomoči.

1.2 Nizozemski režim za mednarodne finančne dejavnosti

Nizozemski režim za mednarodne finančne dejavnosti je določenim družbam v mednarodnih skupinah omogočal oblikovanje posebne rezerve za tveganja, v katero je bilo mogoče vključiti do 80 odstotkov dobička iz finančnih dejavnosti. Do režima so bile upravičene predvsem skupine, ki so poslovale v najmanj štirih državah oziroma na najmanj dveh celinah, zato ugodnost ni bila splošno dostopna vsem gospodarskim družbam. Komisija je ugotovila, da je režim omogočal takojšnje in znatno zmanjšanje davčnega bremena, saj so bile v rezervi zadržane vsote obdavčene pozneje, po nižji stopnji ali v nekaterih primerih sploh ne. Ukrep je Skupina za kodeks ravnanja predhodno označila kot škodljiv ukrep B 004. (9) Komisija je 17. februarja 2003 odločila, da je Nizozemska režim izvajala nezakonito in da pomeni državno pomoč, ki ni združljiva s skupnim trgom. Nizozemski je naložila prenehanje režima, pri čemer je bilo zaradi varstva legitimnih pričakovanj obstoječim upravičencem omogočeno omejeno prehodno obdobje, vendar najpozneje do 31. decembra 2010. Nizozemska je že decembra 2002 prenehala sprejemati nove vloge za vključitev v režim. (9) Dejanski rezultat je bil zaprtje posebnega sistema, ki je mednarodnim skupinam omogočal znatno davčno odložitev pri financiranju povezanih družb. Primer je pomemben tudi zato, ker je Komisija zavrnila argument, da je selektivna davčna ugodnost upravičena že zato, ker preprečuje selitev kapitala ali privablja finančne dejavnosti v državo.

1.3 Luksemburške holdinške družbe iz leta 1929

Luksemburški režim tako imenovanih holdinških družb iz leta 1929 je desetletja omogočal posebno davčno obravnavo družb, katerih osnovna dejavnost je bila upravljanje finančnih naložb in udeležb. Po podatkih, navedenih v odločbi Komisije, je v Luksemburgu delovalo skoraj 13.000 takšnih oproščenih holdinških družb, zato režim ni bil obrobna izjema, temveč pomemben del luksemburškega finančnega modela. Komisija je pri uvedbi postopka izrecno izhajala tudi iz Kodeksa ravnanja, ki je bil sprejet zaradi omejevanja škodljive davčne konkurence. Julija 2006 je ugotovila, da davčni režim za oproščene holdinške družbe pomeni državno pomoč, ki ni združljiva s skupnim trgom. Luksemburgu je naložila, naj režim odpravi ali spremeni najpozneje do 31. decembra 2006. Od vročitve odločbe novih upravičencev ni bilo več dovoljeno vključevati, obstoječe družbe pa so lahko ugodnosti uporabljale samo v prehodnem obdobju do konca leta 2010. Komisija je prehodni rok dovolila zaradi gospodarskih posledic, zaposlenih in legitimnih pričakovanj obstoječih družb, vendar je hkrati določila omejitve glede prenosa njihovega kapitala. (10) Rezultat je bila odprava enega najstarejših in najpomembnejših evropskih režimov za davčno oproščene finančne holdinge. Tudi ta primer potrjuje, da lahko Kodeks politično identificira problem, dejansko pravno spremembo pa praviloma zagotovi šele uporaba zavezujočih pravil EU ali pripravljenost države, da svojo zakonodajo spremeni.

Zakaj ta članek prav zdaj?

Razprava o pravni naravi, rezultatih in pomanjkljivostih Kodeksa je za Slovenijo postala posebej aktualna, ker je bila Tina Humar 21. maja 2026 izvoljena za predsednico Skupine za kodeks ravnanja za dveletni mandat. Tina Humar je generalna direktorica Direktorata za sistem davčnih, carinskih in drugih javnih prihodkov na Ministrstvu za finance Republike Slovenije. Predsednica Skupine ne odloča sama o škodljivosti posameznih davčnih ukrepov, ima pa pomembno vlogo pri usmerjanju dela Skupine, oblikovanju dnevnega reda, iskanju soglasja med državami članicami ter sodelovanju s tretjimi jurisdikcijami. Pri zunanjem delovanju jo podpirata Generalni sekretariat Sveta in Evropska komisija, ki zagotavlja tehnično pomoč. (11) Slovensko predsedovanje je zato priložnost, da se poleg nadaljnjega odpravljanja škodljivih davčnih praks odprejo tudi vprašanja kakovosti analiz, preglednosti odločanja, merljivosti rezultatov in varstva temeljnih pravic. Ta članek ni namenjen kritiki predsednice ali Slovenije, temveč strokovni razpravi o tem, kako bi lahko Skupina v prihodnjih dveh letih postala bolj učinkovita, bolj pregledna in bolj skladna z načeli dobrega upravljanja.

 

 

II. JEDRO

Povzetek

Revidirani kodeks ravnanja na področju podjetniškega obdavčevanja je pomemben instrument Evropske unije za prepoznavanje in odpravljanje škodljivih davčnih ukrepov. Njegova posebnost je, da formalno ni zavezujoč pravni akt EU, temveč politična zaveza držav članic. Kljub temu lahko ocene, sprejete v okviru Skupine za kodeks ravnanja, povzročijo spremembo nacionalne zakonodaje, prenehanje davčnih ugodnosti in pomembne gospodarske posledice za podjetja.

Temeljno vprašanje zato ni le, ali Kodeks učinkovito preprečuje škodljivo davčno konkurenco, temveč tudi, ali je njegov postopek skladen z zahtevami pravne države in temeljnih pravic. Posebej pomembna sta 41. člen Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah, ki zagotavlja pravico do dobrega upravljanja, in 51. člen Listine, ki določa njeno področje uporabe. Analiza pokaže, da Kodeks vsebuje pomembno strokovno komponento, vendar končno odločanje ostaja politično, procesne pravice neposredno prizadetih oseb pa niso ustrezno urejene.

1. Kodeks kot politična zaveza z dejanskimi pravnimi učinki

Svet Evropske unije in predstavniki vlad držav članic so leta 2022 sprejeli revidirani kodeks ravnanja na področju podjetniškega obdavčevanja. Dokument izrecno določa, da je Kodeks politična zaveza ter da ne spreminja pravic in dolžnosti držav članic niti razdelitve pristojnosti med Evropsko unijo in državami članicami. Hkrati opredeljuje Skupino za kodeks ravnanja kot skupino primerljivih partnerjev med državami članicami, ki deluje ob nepogrešljivi pomoči Evropske komisije. (1)

Kodeks zato ni uredba, direktiva ali sklep iz 288. člena Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije. Njegovih pravil praviloma ni mogoče neposredno izvrševati pred nacionalnimi sodišči na enak način kot zavezujoče pravo EU. Toda formalna nezavezujočnost ne pomeni, da je Kodeks brez pravnih in gospodarskih učinkov.

Države članice se z njim politično zavezujejo, da ne bodo uvajale novih škodljivih davčnih ukrepov in da bodo obstoječe škodljive ukrepe spremenile ali odpravile. Negativna ocena davčnega režima lahko zato povzroči spremembo nacionalnega zakona, prenehanje davčne ugodnosti, spremembo investicijskih odločitev ter poseg v poslovne modele podjetij. Pri tretjih državah lahko ugotovitve Skupine prispevajo k uvrstitvi jurisdikcije na seznam EU z jurisdikcijami, ki niso pripravljene sodelovati v davčne namene. (1)

Kodeks je zato značilen primer mehkega prava, ki nima klasične pravne zavezujočnosti, vendar lahko povzroča razmeroma trde posledice. Prav ta razkorak med formalno naravo in dejanskimi učinki ustvarja osrednji problem pravnega varstva. Politični dokument lahko postane odločilna podlaga za poznejši zakonodajni ali upravni ukrep, ne da bi bil prvotni postopek podvržen enakim procesnim pravilom kot formalni upravni ali zakonodajni postopek.

2. Legitimni cilj in omejeno razumevanje davčne pravičnosti

Cilj Kodeksa je legitimen. Namenjen je omejevanju davčnih ukrepov, ki lahko pomembno vplivajo na kraj opravljanja poslovne dejavnosti, povzročajo erozijo davčne osnove, omogočajo dvojno neobdavčevanje ali večkratno uporabo iste davčne ugodnosti.

Revidirani Kodeks ne zajema več samo preferenčnih davčnih režimov, temveč tudi nekatere splošne značilnosti nacionalnih davčnih sistemov. Preferenčni ukrep se šteje za potencialno škodljivega, kadar zagotavlja znatno nižjo dejansko stopnjo obdavčitve od tiste, ki se običajno uporablja v državi članici. Pri presoji se upoštevajo zlasti omejenost ugodnosti na nerezidente, odsotnost resnične gospodarske dejavnosti, odstopanje od mednarodno sprejetih pravil o določanju dobička in pomanjkanje preglednosti. (1)

Kodeks pa pojma poštene obdavčitve ne razume celovito. Njegova osrednja skrb ni pravičnost davčnega sistema do davčnega zavezanca, temveč vpliv nacionalnega ukrepa na davčne osnove, gospodarsko dejavnost in interese drugih držav.

Kodeks praviloma ne presoja, ali je nacionalni davek sorazmeren, ali zagotavlja ekonomski minimum, ali spoštuje legitimna pričakovanja davčnih zavezancev in ali nacionalna davčna uprava zagotavlja učinkovito pravno varstvo. Prav tako ne presoja splošne razdelitve davčnih bremen med delo, potrošnjo in kapital. Izraz »poštena davčna konkurenca« je zato vsebinsko ožji od pojma poštenega davčnega sistema.

3. Kdo ugotavlja dejansko stanje?

Postopek se začne s priglasitvijo davčnega ukrepa. Države članice se medsebojno obveščajo o obstoječih in predlaganih ukrepih, ki bi lahko spadali na področje uporabe Kodeksa. Na nepriglašeni ukrep lahko opozorita tudi druga država članica ali Evropska komisija.

Nato se lahko pripravi tako imenovani dogovorjeni opis ukrepa. Države članice odločijo, ali bodo postopek nadaljevale in ali bodo tak opis pripravile. Šele na podlagi dogovorjenega opisa se ocenjuje, ali je davčni ukrep škodljiv. (1)

Pojem dogovorjenega opisa je praktičen, vendar pravno problematičen. Dejstva niso nujno rezultat neodvisnega dokaznega postopka, temveč dogovora med predstavniki držav članic. Kodeks ne določa jasnega dokaznega bremena, dokaznega standarda ali postopka za primer, ko država članica in Komisija ne soglašata o bistvenih dejstvih.

Posebej pomembna je določba, po kateri naj Skupina preuči gospodarske dejavnike in podatke o vplivu, »na katere je opozorjena«. Takšna formulacija ne vzpostavlja jasne obveznosti Skupine ali Komisije, da po uradni dolžnosti ugotovita popolno in materialno resnico. Prav tako Kodeks ne določa obvezne kontrafaktualne analize, s katero bi bilo mogoče oceniti, kaj bi se zgodilo z investicijo, zaposlovanjem ali davčnimi prihodki, če posameznega ukrepa ne bi bilo. (1)

Evropska komisija ima pri tem pomembno strokovno vlogo. Na podlagi informacij držav članic pripravlja osnutke opisov in osnutke ocen. Toda Komisija ne sodeluje pri odločanju Skupine. Rezultate potrdijo predstavniki držav članic in jih predložijo Svetu v odobritev. (1)

Institucionalni model je zato jasen: Komisija zagotavlja strokovno podlago, države članice pa sprejmejo politično odločitev.

4. Države članice kot predmet presoje in hkrati odločevalke

Že sklep o ustanovitvi Skupine iz leta 1998 določa, da je njen namen ocenjevanje davčnih ukrepov, ki bi lahko spadali na področje Kodeksa, in nadzor nad zagotavljanjem informacij o teh ukrepih. (2)

Isti dokument izrecno poudarja politični pomen dela Skupine. Zato države članice in Komisija imenujejo predstavnike na visoki ravni. (2)

To pomeni, da Skupina ni neodvisen evropski davčni regulator ali strokovni senat. Države članice so hkrati zakonodajalke lastnih davčnih režimov, ponudnice informacij o njih, ocenjevalke ukrepov drugih držav in končne odločevalke v postopku medsebojnega nadzora.

Tak sistem medsebojnega pregleda lahko spodbuja politično sodelovanje, vendar vsebuje strukturno tveganje vzajemnih kompromisov. Država lahko zadržano presoja režim druge države, ker želi pozneje podobno razumevanje za svoj režim. Končna ocena zato ni nujno zgolj rezultat strokovne uporabe objektivnih meril, temveč lahko vključuje tudi nacionalne interese in politična pogajanja.

Kodeks ne določa pravil o izločitvi predstavnika države, konfliktu interesov ali neodvisni zunanji potrditvi analize. Prav tako ne določa objave stališča vsake države članice in načina glasovanja. Te pomanjkljivosti otežujejo presojo nepristranskosti in enake obravnave primerljivih davčnih režimov.

5. Preglednost končnega rezultata, ne pa nujno procesa

Kodeks poudarja željo po čim bolj pregledni uporabi svojih pravil, vendar hkrati varuje zaupnost, ki naj bi bila potrebna za izmenjavo občutljivih informacij. Končni dokumenti, ki jih odobri Svet, se objavijo, dodatni dokumenti pa se objavijo le, kadar je to primerno in skladno s pravili o dostopu do dokumentov. (1)

Javnost zato lahko vidi končno oceno, ne pa nujno celotne analitične in politične poti do nje. Praviloma ni popolnoma razvidno, katere podatke je predložila država, katere dodatne informacije je zahtevala Komisija, kako se je spreminjal osnutek ocene, katera država je nasprotovala ugotovitvam in kateri politični kompromisi so vplivali na končni rezultat.

Zaupnost je lahko legitimna zaradi davčne tajnosti, poslovnih skrivnosti in mednarodnih odnosov. Vendar zaupnost ne bi smela zajeti tudi metodologije, razlogov za odločitev in stališč, ki ne razkrivajo varovanih podatkov. V sedanji zasnovi obstaja nevarnost, da se varovanje občutljivih podatkov uporablja kot širša utemeljitev za netransparentnost političnega odločanja.

6. Učinki Kodeksa na človekove pravice

Kodeks nima posebnega poglavja o človekovih oziroma temeljnih pravicah. Ne ureja pravice prizadetega podjetja do izjave, vpogleda v spis, obrazložene odločitve ali učinkovitega pravnega sredstva. Prav tako ne določa posebnega postopka za varstvo poslovnih skrivnosti, osebnih podatkov in legitimnih pričakovanj upravičencev davčnih režimov.

To ne pomeni, da Kodeks učinkuje samo negativno. Omejevanje škodljivih režimov lahko varuje davčne prihodke ter prispeva k bolj enakomerni porazdelitvi davčnih bremen. Če zelo mobilna podjetja zaradi posebnih režimov plačujejo nesorazmerno malo davka, morajo izpad pogosto nadomestiti manj mobilni davčni zavezanci, zaposleni, potrošniki ter mala in srednja podjetja.

Varovanje davčne osnove lahko zato posredno prispeva k financiranju zdravstva, šolstva, socialne varnosti in drugih javnih storitev. Vendar se ta pozitivni učinek v okviru Kodeksa ne meri sistematično z vidika socialnih in človekovih pravic. Kodeks presoja predvsem vpliv na davčno konkurenco, ne pa celotnega družbenega učinka posameznega ukrepa.

7. Člen 51 Listine: kdaj se temeljne pravice sploh uporabljajo?

Člen 51 Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah določa, da se Listina uporablja za institucije, organe, urade in agencije Unije. Za države članice se uporablja samo, kadar izvajajo pravo Unije. Listina hkrati ne razširja pristojnosti EU in ne ustvarja novih pristojnosti. (3)

Pri Kodeksu se zato pojavi vprašanje pripisljivosti posameznega dejanja. V Skupini sodelujejo predstavniki držav članic in Komisije, tehnično podlago pripravlja Komisija, rezultate potrjujejo države članice, končne dokumente pa odobri Svet.

Kadar delujejo Komisija, Generalni sekretariat Sveta ali Svet kot institucija EU, jih zavezuje Listina. Politična oziroma nezavezujoča narava dokumenta sama po sebi ne pomeni, da lahko institucija EU deluje zunaj zahtev temeljnih pravic. Bolj zapleten je položaj predstavnikov vlad držav članic, kadar delujejo v medvladni in ne strogo institucionalni vlogi.

Dodatno vprašanje nastane, ko država članica na podlagi negativne ocene spremeni nacionalno zakonodajo. Če je sprememba zgolj posledica politične zaveze po Kodeksu, ni avtomatično jasno, da država s tem »izvaja pravo Unije« v smislu 51. člena Listine. Če pa nacionalni ukrep hkrati izvaja direktivo EU, odločbo Komisije o državni pomoči ali drug zavezujoč akt EU, se Listina uporablja.

Sodišče EU je v zadevi Åkerberg Fransson pojasnilo, da se temeljne pravice iz Listine uporabljajo v vseh položajih, ki jih ureja pravo EU, ne pa zunaj takih položajev. Kadar nacionalna ureditev spada na področje prava EU, se uporabljajo tudi temeljne pravice iz Listine. (4)

Iz tega izhaja pomembna posledica. Kodeks ne sme ustvariti območja, v katerem se odločilna politična presoja izvede na evropski ravni, pravne posledice pa se formalno pripišejo samo nacionalnemu zakonodajalcu, zaradi česar naj bi bila uporaba Listine izključena. Pri presoji je treba upoštevati dejansko vsebinsko povezavo nacionalnega ukrepa s pravom EU, ne zgolj formalno označbo dokumenta kot politične zaveze.

8. Člen 41 Listine in pravica do dobrega upravljanja

Člen 41 Listine določa, da ima vsakdo pravico, da institucije, organi, uradi in agencije Unije njegove zadeve obravnavajo nepristransko, pravično in v razumnem roku. Pravica vključuje predvsem pravico do izjave pred sprejetjem neugodnega posamičnega ukrepa, pravico do vpogleda v spis ter obveznost uprave, da svoje odločitve obrazloži. (3)

Sodišče EU je v zadevi Mukarubega pojasnilo, da je 41. člen po svojem besedilu neposredno naslovljen na institucije, organe, urade in agencije EU, ne pa na organe držav članic. Vendar je hkrati poudarilo, da je pravica do izjave sestavni del pravic obrambe kot splošnega načela prava EU. Kadar nacionalni organ sprejema ukrep na področju prava EU, mora zato spoštovati pravico naslovnika, da učinkovito predstavi svoje stališče. (5)

Pri Kodeksu je treba razlikovati med abstraktno presojo davčnega režima in individualnim ukrepom zoper konkretno podjetje. Skupina formalno presoja davčno ureditev države, ne davčne obveznosti posameznega zavezanca. Zato iz 41. člena ni mogoče avtomatično izpeljati pravice vsakega uporabnika režima, da sodeluje v postopku Skupine.

Položaj pa je drugačen, kadar je režim namenjen zelo omejenemu številu podjetij ali kadar ocena temelji na podatkih, ki neposredno identificirajo posameznega upravičenca. Bolj ko je podjetje individualizirano in bolj neposredno ko ocena vpliva na njegov pravni ali gospodarski položaj, težje je postopek obravnavati kot popolnoma abstraktno politično presojo.

Sedanji Kodeks podjetjem ne zagotavlja pravice, da se seznanijo z očitki, popravijo napačne podatke ali odgovorijo na osnutek negativne ocene. Država članica sicer sodeluje v postopku, vendar njeni interesi niso nujno enaki interesom podjetja. Država lahko sprejme politični kompromis, se odpove obrambi režima ali spremeni zakon zaradi širših odnosov z drugimi državami.

Sodelovanje države zato ne more vedno nadomestiti pravice neposredno prizadete osebe do izjave.

9. Nepristranskost, vpogled v spis in obrazložitev

Zahteva po nepristranskosti je posebej občutljiva, ker končno odločitev sprejemajo predstavniki držav članic. Kodeks nima neodvisnega strokovnega senata, pravil o konfliktu interesov ali formalnega postopka izločitve. Komisija, ki pripravlja strokovno analizo, pri odločanju ne sodeluje.

Pravica do vpogleda v spis mora biti usklajena z varstvom davčne tajnosti ter poslovnih in poklicnih skrivnosti. Toda rešitev ne sme biti popolna nedostopnost gradiva. Uporabiti bi bilo mogoče anonimizacijo, delni dostop, izločitev poslovnih skrivnosti, zaupni dostop pooblaščenca ali pripravo dovolj natančnega povzetka bistvenih ugotovitev.

Kodeks prav tako ne določa natančnega standarda obrazložitve. Končna ocena bi morala pojasniti ugotovljena dejstva, uporabljena merila, gospodarske učinke, obravnavo nasprotnih argumentov in razloge za razlikovanje od primerljivih režimov drugih držav. Brez takšne obrazložitve ni mogoče učinkovito preveriti nepristranskosti, enake obravnave in sorazmernosti.

Sodišče EU je v zadevi Mukarubega poudarilo, da mora organ skrbno in nepristransko preučiti relevantne okoliščine ter odločitev dovolj konkretno obrazložiti. Pravica do izjave ni zgolj možnost predložitve pripomb, temveč tudi obveznost organa, da jih dejansko obravnava. (5)

10. Od pravice do dobrega upravljanja do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva

Čeprav je predmet te analize predvsem 41. in 51. člen Listine, je njuno uporabo treba povezati s 47. členom, ki zagotavlja pravico do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva.

Kodeks ne določa posebnega pravnega sredstva zoper dogovorjeni opis, negativno oceno davčnega režima ali priporočilo za njegovo odpravo. Prizadeto podjetje lahko pravno varstvo praviloma uveljavlja šele pozneje, na primer zoper nacionalno davčno odločbo ali nacionalni zakon, če nacionalna ureditev takšno presojo sploh dopušča.

V zadevi Berlioz Investment Fund je Sodišče EU obravnavalo davčno sodelovanje med državami članicami in odločilo, da mora imeti oseba, ki je sankcionirana zaradi nespoštovanja zahteve po informacijah, možnost učinkovitega sodnega nadzora zakonitosti zahteve, na kateri temelji sankcija. Zadeva potrjuje, da mora pri izvajanju evropskega davčnega mehanizma obstajati sodni nadzor nad pravno in dejansko podlago ukrepa, kadar ta povzroča zavezujoče posledice za posameznika. (6)

Ta logika je pomembna tudi za Kodeks. Soft law ne more biti neposredna podlaga za sankcijo ali omejitev temeljne pravice. Če politični oceni sledijo pravno zavezujoče obveznosti, morajo te temeljiti na dovolj jasnem pravnem aktu, prizadeta oseba pa mora imeti možnost učinkovitega sodnega varstva.

11. Kako bi bilo treba Kodeks spremeniti?

Kodeks bi moral jasneje določiti, kdo je odgovoren za ugotavljanje dejanskega stanja in kdo za končno odločitev. Sedanja razdelitev, po kateri Komisija pripravlja osnutek, države članice pa politično odločajo, ne zagotavlja dovolj jasne odgovornosti.

Potrebna bi bila javna in enotna metodologija presoje. Ta bi morala določiti minimalne podatke, dokazni standard, način izračuna dejanske stopnje obdavčitve, merila gospodarske prisotnosti in način ugotavljanja vpliva na druge države. Pri pomembnih režimih bi morala vključevati kontrafaktualno analizo in neodvisno strokovno preverjanje nacionalnih podatkov.

Prizadetim podjetjem ne bi bilo treba priznati položaja stranke v vsakem postopku presoje splošnega davčnega ukrepa. Morala pa bi obstajati možnost ciljnega sodelovanja, kadar je podjetje neposredno določljivo, kadar se uporabljajo njegovi podatki ali kadar bo ocena verjetno povzročila neposreden poseg v njegov pravni položaj.

Končni dokument bi moral vsebovati ugotovljeno dejansko stanje, uporabljena merila, bistvene gospodarske podatke, stališča zadevne države in jasno obrazložitev končne ocene. Po ustreznem obdobju zaupnosti bi bilo treba objaviti tudi stališča držav članic in rezultat odločanja.

Kodeks bi moral nazadnje vsebovati izrecno določbo, da njegovo izvajanje ne posega v pravice iz Listine ter da morajo biti vsi poznejši zavezujoči ukrepi podvrženi učinkovitemu sodnemu nadzoru.

Sklep

Revidirani kodeks ravnanja ima pomembno vlogo pri omejevanju škodljive davčne konkurence. Njegova prednost je prilagodljivost, saj omogoča politično usklajevanje na področju, na katerem države članice skrbno varujejo svojo davčno suverenost.

Toda ista prilagodljivost je tudi njegova največja slabost. Kodeks je politična zaveza z dejanskimi pravnimi in gospodarskimi posledicami, ne da bi vzpostavil popoln sistem procesnih pravic, neodvisnega odločanja in učinkovitega pravnega sredstva.

Člen 51 Listine zahteva, da se za vsako fazo postopka ugotovi, ali gre za delovanje institucije EU oziroma izvajanje prava EU. Hibridna institucionalna ureditev ne sme omogočiti izmikanja odgovornosti med Komisijo, Svetom in predstavniki držav članic.

Člen 41 pa zahteva, da evropski organi ravnajo nepristransko, pravično, v razumnem roku in na podlagi dovolj obrazložene presoje. Kadar postopek neposredno prizadene določljivo osebo, postanejo posebej pomembne pravica do izjave, dostop do bistvenega gradiva in možnost učinkovitega pravnega varstva.

Temeljna kritika Kodeksa zato ni usmerjena v njegov cilj, temveč v njegovo procesno arhitekturo:

Kodeks želi zagotavljati pošteno davčno konkurenco med državami, ne zagotavlja pa še dovolj jasno poštenega postopka osebam, na katere njegove ugotovitve dejansko vplivajo.

 

III. NAMESTO SKLEPA: SLOVENSKA PRILOŽNOST ZA RAZVOJ ETIČNIH DAVČNIH SISTEMOV EU-27

Kritična analiza Kodeksa ne bi smela ostati zgolj pri ugotovitvi, da Skupina za kodeks ravnanja deluje kot politični meddržavni mehanizem z omejenimi procesnimi varovalkami. Slovenija ima zaradi dveletnega predsedovanja Tine Humar priložnost, da razpravo usmeri tudi v iskanje rešitev. Tina Humar je bila za predsednico izvoljena 21. maja 2026, njen mandat pa traja dve leti. Predsednica sama ne more spremeniti Kodeksa ali razširiti pristojnosti Skupine, lahko pa pomembno vpliva na njen delovni program, oblikovanje dnevnega reda, pripravo strokovnih razprav in iskanje soglasja med državami članicami.

Sedanji mandat Skupine je usmerjen predvsem v prepoznavanje škodljivih davčnih ukrepov, pošteno davčno konkurenco in presojo davčnih značilnosti, ki vplivajo na lokacijo poslovne dejavnosti. Skupina zato ne more postati evropsko ustavno sodišče za davčne zadeve. Lahko pa začne sistematično obravnavati vprašanje, ali davčni sistemi držav članic poleg preprečevanja škodljive konkurence zagotavljajo tudi minimalne standarde pravne države, dobrega upravljanja in enakega položaja plačnikov davkov.

1. Predlog za razvoj Skupine v forum za etične davčne sisteme EU-27

Prvi predlog je, da bi Tina Humar med svojim mandatom spodbudila ustanovitev posebne podskupine oziroma stalnega strokovnega foruma za etične, ustavnopravno vzdržne in administrativno poštene davčne sisteme EU-27.

Takšnega foruma predsednica ne bi mogla ustanoviti sama. Že ustanovitveni sklepi iz leta 1998 pa določajo, da se lahko ob formalnem soglasju Sveta ustanovi ena ali več podskupin za obravnavanje posameznih vprašanj. To daje dovolj institucionalne podlage, da bi predsednica držav članicam predlagala razširitev delovnega programa in pripravo posebnega mandata.

Namen novega foruma ne bi bil določati enotnih davčnih stopenj ali posegati v davčno suverenost držav članic. Njegova naloga bi bila oblikovati skupna merila, po katerih bi bilo mogoče ugotavljati, ali posamezen davčni sistem zagotavlja minimalno raven pravičnosti, predvidljivosti in učinkovitega pravnega varstva.

Etični davčni sistem ni nujno sistem z nizkimi ali visokimi davki. Je sistem, v katerem so davčne obveznosti določene z dovolj jasnim zakonom, primerljivi davčni zavezanci obravnavani primerljivo, posegi države pa so nujni, primerni in sorazmerni. Davčni zavezanec mora vnaprej razumeti svojo obveznost, imeti možnost sodelovati v postopku, prejeti obrazloženo odločitev v razumnem roku ter imeti dostop do učinkovitega in pravočasnega pravnega sredstva.

Takšen forum bi lahko pripravil evropsko matriko poštenosti davčnih sistemov. Presoja ne bi bila omejena samo na vprašanje, ali država z določenim režimom privablja dobiček iz drugih držav, temveč bi zajela tudi kakovost davčne zakonodaje in davčnih postopkov. Med merili bi bili zakonitost, enakost, pravna varnost, sorazmernost, varstvo legitimnih pričakovanj, pravica do izjave, pravica do vpogleda v spis, obrazloženost odločitev, trajanje postopkov in učinkovitost sodnega varstva.

Posebno področje presoje bi moral biti položaj mikro, malih in srednjih podjetij. MSP praviloma nimajo lastnih davčnih oddelkov, mednarodnih svetovalnih mrež in finančnih virov, ki jih imajo velike skupine. Zanje lahko že zapletenost zakonodaje, pogoste spremembe pravil, dolgotrajni postopki in nesorazmerne zahteve po dokumentaciji pomenijo dejansko omejitev podjetniške svobode.

Forum bi zato pri vsakem pomembnem evropskem ali nacionalnem davčnem ukrepu izvedel tudi preizkus poštenosti do MSP. Ne bi se preverjalo samo, koliko davka bo ukrep prinesel, temveč tudi, koliko časa, zunanjih strokovnih storitev in informacijskih prilagoditev bo zahteval od povprečnega mikro ali malega podjetja. Ukrep, pri katerem stroški izpolnjevanja obveznosti niso sorazmerni z davčnim tveganjem, ne bi mogel biti označen kot v celoti pošten, čeprav bi bil formalno enak za vsa podjetja.

Forum bi moral obravnavati tudi položaj fizičnih oseb, zlasti oseb z nizkimi prihodki, invalidov, starejših, čezmejnih delavcev in oseb, ki ne morejo učinkovito uporabljati digitalnih storitev. Formalno enaka digitalna obveznost lahko povzroči dejansko neenakost, kadar posameznik nima znanja, opreme ali dostopa do strokovne pomoči.

Komisija je že leta 2016 pripravila smernice za model evropskega kodeksa davčnih zavezancev. Namen kodeksa je bil izboljšati sodelovanje, zaupanje in preglednost med davčnimi upravami in davčnimi zavezanci. Toda evropski kodeks je ostal nezavezujoč model ravnanja in ne ustvarja neposredno izvršljivih pravic.

Naloga novega foruma bi bila zato nadgraditi ta dokument. Namesto splošnih priporočil bi moral pripraviti merljive standarde, časovne roke in kazalnike, po katerih bi bilo mogoče primerjati vseh 27 držav članic.

Pri analitičnem delu se forum ne bi smel opirati samo na samoporočanje držav članic. Komisija bi morala skupaj z neodvisnimi raziskovalnimi ustanovami, univerzami, organizacijami davčnih zavezancev, predstavniki MSP in strokovnimi združenji pripravljati preverljive analize. Komisija že vodi Platformo za dobro davčno upravljanje, v kateri sodelujejo davčni strokovnjaki, predstavniki podjetij in civilne družbe, zato za vključevanje zunanjega znanja že obstaja institucionalni model.

Rezultat mandata Tine Humar bi lahko bil prvi dokument z naslovom:

Evropska načela etičnega davčnega sistema in dobrega javnodajatvenega upravljanja EU-27.

Dokument bi sprva lahko imel obliko priporočila ali sklepov Sveta. Njegov dolgoročni cilj pa bi moral biti priprava zavezujočih minimalnih pravil za davčne postopke in pravice plačnikov javnih dajatev.

2. Kaj bi moral ETAF predlagati?

ETAF – European Tax Adviser Federation – bi moral izkoristiti slovensko predsedovanje Skupini in Svetu predložiti strokovno izdelan model evropske zakonodajne pobude.

ETAF je že leta 2018 sprejel Listino reguliranih evropskih davčnih svetovalcev. Ta poudarja strokovno skrbnost, neodvisnost, objektivnost, stalno strokovno izobraževanje, zaupnost in kakovost davčnega svetovanja. ETAF je pozneje zahteval tudi jasnejše evropsko varstvo poklicne zaupnosti davčnih svetovalcev ter opozoril, da različna nacionalna ureditev povzroča neenako varstvo strank in neenake konkurenčne pogoje.

Naslednji logični korak zato ne bi smel biti samo obramba položaja davčnega svetovalca kot poklica. ETAF bi moral izhajati iz pravic stranke ter predlagati evropski sistem, v katerem je kakovostno, neodvisno in zaupno davčno svetovanje eden od pogojev za dejansko uresničevanje pravic plačnikov davkov.

Pravica, zapisana v zakonu ali Listini (LEUTP), za posameznika ali malo podjetje pogosto nima dejanske vrednosti, če oseba ne zna prepoznati kršitve, pripraviti dokazov, razumeti davčnega izračuna ali učinkovito uporabiti pravnega sredstva. Etični davčni posrednik zato ni samo zasebni ponudnik storitev. Je pomemben del infrastrukture pravne države, ki davčnemu zavezancu omogoča razumeti svoje obveznosti in uveljavljati svoje pravice.

To pa ne pomeni, da bi država svoje obveznosti lahko prenesla na davčne svetovalce. Primarno odgovornost za zakonit, razumljiv in pošten postopek mora vedno nositi davčna uprava. Davčni svetovalec mora biti dodatno varovalo, ne nadomestilo za dobro upravo.

ETAF bi moral zato pripraviti model:

PREDLOGA DIREKTIVE SVETA O MINIMALNIH STANDARDIH DOBREGA DAVČNEGA UPRAVLJANJA, PRAVICAH PLAČNIKOV DAVKOV IN ETIČNEM DAVČNEM POSREDOVANJU

Formalno zakonodajnega predloga ne more vložiti ETAF niti predsednica Skupine. Pravico zakonodajne pobude ima praviloma Evropska komisija. Svet pa lahko po 241. členu PDEU z navadno večino od Komisije zahteva izvedbo potrebnih raziskav in predložitev ustreznega predloga; če Komisija predloga ne poda, mora Svetu pojasniti razloge.

Tina Humar bi lahko zato v okviru Skupine spodbudila sprejetje sklepov, s katerimi bi Svet Komisijo pozval k pripravi ocene učinkov in zakonodajnega predloga. Njena vloga bi bila predvsem v oblikovanju strokovnega in političnega soglasja, ne v neposrednem pisanju ali sprejemanju direktive.

2.1 Pravna omejitev: ena direktiva ne more brez težav zajeti vseh javnih dajatev

Pri pripravi predloga je treba biti pravno natančen. Člen 114 PDEU, ki omogoča približevanje pravil notranjega trga po rednem zakonodajnem postopku, se ne uporablja za davčne določbe.

Za neposredno obdavčevanje bi bila osrednja pravna podlaga 115. člen PDEU, po katerem Svet soglasno sprejema direktive za približevanje nacionalnih predpisov, ki neposredno vplivajo na vzpostavitev ali delovanje notranjega trga. Za DDV, trošarine in druge oblike posrednih davkov bi se uporabljal 113. člen PDEU, ki prav tako zahteva soglasje Sveta.

Člen 197 PDEU lahko podpira izmenjavo informacij, usposabljanje in razvoj upravnih zmogljivosti držav članic, vendar izrecno izključuje harmonizacijo nacionalnih zakonov in drugih predpisov. Zato sam ne bi zadostoval za uvedbo izvršljivih pravic davčnih zavezancev.

Pravno najvarnejša rešitev bi bil evropski zakonodajni paket. Prva direktiva bi urejala minimalne standarde na davčnem področju na podlagi 113. in 115. člena PDEU. Za druge javne dajatve, prispevke in obvezna plačila pa bi bilo treba uporabiti ustrezne sektorske pravne podlage ali določiti, da države članice pravila direktive prostovoljno razširijo na celotno javnodajatveno področje.

2.2 Predlagano jedro direktive

Člen 1 – Predmet in namen

Ta direktiva določa minimalne standarde dobrega davčnega upravljanja, procesne pravice plačnikov davkov ter pogoje za kakovostno, neodvisno in etično davčno svetovanje v Evropski uniji. Namen direktive je zagotoviti enakovredno minimalno raven varstva fizičnih oseb in podjetij v davčnih postopkih, zlasti v zadevah z vplivom na notranji trg ali povezavo s pravom Evropske unije.

Člen 2 – Temeljna načela

Države članice zagotovijo, da se davčne obveznosti določajo in izvršujejo skladno z načeli zakonitosti, enakosti, pravne varnosti, sorazmernosti, varstva legitimnih pričakovanj, dobrega upravljanja in učinkovitega pravnega varstva. Davčni organ mora pri izbiri ukrepov uporabiti tisti zakoniti ukrep, ki ob enaki učinkovitosti najmanj posega v pravice plačnika davka.

Člen 3 – Pravica do dobrega davčnega upravljanja

Vsak plačnik davka ima pravico, da davčni organ njegovo zadevo obravnava nepristransko, strokovno, pravično in v razumnem roku. Pred sprejetjem ukrepa, ki lahko neugodno vpliva na njegov položaj, mora imeti možnost, da se seznani z bistvenimi dejstvi, dokazi in pravno presojo ter da poda svoje pripombe. Končna odločitev mora biti obrazložena tako, da je mogoče preveriti ugotovljeno dejansko stanje, uporabo prava in sorazmernost ukrepa.

Člen 4 – Vpogled v spis in varstvo zaupnih podatkov

Plačnik davka in njegov pooblaščenec imata pravico do dostopa do dokumentov in podatkov, na katerih temelji odločitev. Dostop se lahko omeji samo v nujnem in sorazmernem obsegu zaradi varstva osebnih podatkov, davčne tajnosti, poslovnih skrivnosti ali pravic tretjih oseb. Tudi ob omejitvi dostopa mora organ zagotoviti dovolj natančen povzetek bistvenih dejstev in razlogov, da je mogoče učinkovito uresničevati pravice obrambe.

Člen 5 – Učinkovito pravno sredstvo

Plačnik davka mora imeti pravico do pravočasnega in učinkovitega upravnega ter sodnega pravnega sredstva. Pravilo o takojšnji izvršljivosti davčne obveznosti ne sme povzročiti nepopravljive škode ali ogroziti ekonomskega minimuma posameznika oziroma nadaljnjega poslovanja podjetja, kadar je zahtevek plačnika očitno utemeljen ali kadar bi bila izvršba nesorazmerna.

Člen 6 – Posebno varstvo MSP in ranljivih oseb

Države članice morajo pri določanju poročevalskih, dokumentacijskih in digitalnih obveznosti upoštevati velikost, gospodarsko moč in dejanske administrativne zmogljivosti plačnika davka. Za mikro in mala podjetja se ne smejo določiti obveznosti, katerih stroški so očitno nesorazmerni z davčnim tveganjem. Ranljivim fizičnim osebam in mikro podjetjem mora biti zagotovljen dostop do brezplačne ali finančno podprte osnovne davčne pomoči.

Člen 7 – Pravica do neodvisnega davčnega svetovanja

Vsaka oseba ima pravico, da jo v davčnem postopku zastopa ustrezno usposobljen in neodvisen davčni svetovalec. Države članice zagotovijo pregledna pravila o strokovnih kvalifikacijah, odgovornosti, stalnem izobraževanju in nadzoru kakovosti davčnih posrednikov, ne da bi neutemeljeno omejevale prosti pretok storitev.

Člen 8 – Etični standard davčnega posrednika

Davčni posrednik mora ravnati strokovno, neodvisno, objektivno in v korist zakonitih interesov stranke. Stranko mora seznaniti z dejstvi, pravnimi možnostmi, tveganji in posledicami predlaganega ravnanja. Ne sme sodelovati pri davčni utaji, ponarejanju dokazov, prikrivanju dejanskega stanja ali drugi nezakoniti dejavnosti. Hkrati ne sme biti dolžan razkriti zaupne komunikacije, ki je nastala pri zakonitem pravnem ali davčnem svetovanju, razen kadar so izpolnjeni jasni, zakonsko določeni in sorazmerni pogoji.

Člen 9 – Poklicna zaupnost kot pravica stranke

Poklicna zaupnost ni osebni privilegij davčnega svetovalca, temveč varstvo stranke in njenega zaupanja v pravno svetovanje. Varstvo mora biti odvisno od vsebine storitve, ne samo od nacionalnega naziva poklica. Enakovredno zaupno davčnopravno svetovanje mora biti enakovredno varovano, kadar ga zagotavlja neodvisen strokovnjak, ki je zakonsko zavezan k zaupnosti, strokovni odgovornosti in nadzoru.

Člen 10 – Neodvisni nadzor in poročanje

Države članice vzpostavijo neodvisen postopek za obravnavo sistemskih kršitev pravic plačnikov davkov. Komisiji vsako leto poročajo o trajanju postopkov, številu odpravljenih odločb, uspešnosti pravnih sredstev, stroških izpolnjevanja obveznosti za MSP in ukrepih za izboljšanje kakovosti davčne uprave.

2.3 Ideja 41. člena Listine za vse plačnike javnih dajatev

Osrednja ambicija direktive bi bila prenesti vsebinsko idejo 41. člena Listine v vsakodnevna razmerja med nacionalnimi davčnimi organi in davčnimi zavezanci.

Člen 41 je neposredno naslovljen na institucije, organe, urade in agencije EU. Zaradi omejitve iz 51. člena Listine se nanj ni mogoče v vseh povsem notranjih nacionalnih davčnih postopkih avtomatično sklicevati kot na neposredno pravico zoper nacionalni organ. Prav zato bi bila direktiva pomembna: tisto, kar je danes zaradi 51. člena odvisno od vprašanja, ali država izvaja pravo EU, bi postalo na področju uporabe direktive jasno določena pravica nacionalnega prava.

Cilj ne bi bil širiti pristojnosti EU mimo Pogodb. Cilj bi bil v okviru obstoječih pristojnosti določiti minimalni evropski standard, po katerem noben posameznik in nobeno podjetje ne bi smela biti obravnavana kot objekt pobiranja javnih prihodkov.

Davčni zavezanec mora biti subjekt postopka, ki ima pravico vedeti, zakaj mora plačati, na katerih dejstvih temelji odločitev, kdo je odločal, v kakšnem roku bo odločeno in kako lahko učinkovito zaščiti svoje pravice.

Brez neodvisnih, strokovno usposobljenih in etično zavezanih davčnih posrednikov bo takšen sistem težko zaživel v praksi. Vendar morajo biti ti posredniki del sistema varstva stranke, ne podaljšana roka davčne uprave ali industrija za oblikovanje agresivnih davčnih produktov.

To bi morala biti skupna evropska formula:

dobra davčna zakonodaja, dobra davčna uprava, učinkovito pravno varstvo in etični davčni posredniki.

Če bi Tina Humar v svojem dveletnem mandatu uspela odpreti razpravo o takšnem modelu in pridobiti podporo držav članic za pripravo evropske zakonodajne pobude, bi slovensko predsedovanje Skupini preseglo administrativno vodenje obstoječega Kodeksa. Postalo bi začetek razvoja evropskega modela davčnega sistema, ki ne varuje samo davčnih osnov držav, temveč tudi dostojanstvo, pravno varnost in enak položaj ljudi ter podjetij, ki te davke plačujejo.

 

 

 

 

VIRI

(1) Resolucija Sveta in predstavnikov vlad držav članic o revidiranem kodeksu ravnanja na področju podjetniškega obdavčevanja, 2022/C 433/01

Leto: 2022
Organ: Svet Evropske unije in predstavniki vlad držav članic, ki so se sestali v okviru Sveta

Ta dokument je temeljni predmet članka, saj določa veljavni mandat, vsebinska merila in postopek presoje škodljivih davčnih ukrepov. Iz njega izhaja, da je Kodeks politična zaveza in ne klasičen zavezujoč pravni akt EU. Dokument določa pripravo dogovorjenega opisa, vlogo Evropske komisije in končno odločanje predstavnikov držav članic. Pomemben je tudi zato, ker razkriva napetost med deklarirano preglednostjo in varovanjem zaupnosti. Na njegovi podlagi je mogoče oceniti, ali postopek vsebuje zadostne institucionalne in procesne varovalke.

(2) Sklepi Sveta z dne 9. marca 1998 o ustanovitvi Skupine za kodeks ravnanja na področju obdavčitve podjetij, 98/C 99/01

Leto: 1998
Organ: Svet Evropske unije

Dokument predstavlja ustanovitveno podlago Skupine za kodeks ravnanja. Iz njega izhaja, da je bila Skupina ustanovljena za ocenjevanje davčnih ukrepov in nadzor nad zagotavljanjem informacij. Posebej pomembna je izrecna ugotovitev, da ima njeno delo politični pomen. Dokument določa tudi visoko raven predstavnikov držav članic in zaupnost dela Skupine. Zato potrjuje, da Skupina že od začetka ni bila zasnovana kot neodvisen regulatorni ali sodni organ.

(3) Listina Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah, zlasti 41. in 51. člen

Leto: 2012 – prečiščena objava v Uradnem listu EU
Organ: Evropska unija

Člen 41 določa jedro pravice do dobrega upravljanja, ki vključuje nepristranskost, pravično obravnavo, odločanje v razumnem roku, pravico do izjave, vpogled v spis in obrazložitev. Člen 51 določa, da Listina zavezuje institucije EU ter države članice, kadar izvajajo pravo EU. Ta določba je bistvena za presojo hibridnega delovanja Skupine, v kateri sodelujejo institucije EU in predstavniki držav članic. Hkrati preprečuje, da bi Listina sama ustvarjala nove davčne pristojnosti Unije. Oba člena skupaj omogočata presojo, kdo je v postopku odgovoren za spoštovanje procesnih pravic.

(4) Sodba Sodišča EU v zadevi Åklagaren proti Hansu Åkerbergu Franssonu, C-617/10

Leto: 2013
Organ: Sodišče Evropske unije, veliki senat

Sodba je osrednji vir za razlago 51. člena Listine. Sodišče je pojasnilo, da se temeljne pravice iz Listine uporabljajo v vseh položajih, ki jih ureja pravo EU. Hkrati je poudarilo, da se Listina ne uporablja zunaj področja prava EU. Sodba je za članek pomembna zato, ker opozarja, da ni odločilna samo formalna pravna oblika nacionalnega ukrepa, temveč njegova vsebinska povezava s pravom EU. To merilo je ključno pri presoji nacionalnih ukrepov, sprejetih zaradi ocen ali političnih pritiskov v okviru Kodeksa.

(5) Sodba Sodišča EU v zadevi Sophie Mukarubega proti Préfet de police in Préfet de la Seine-Saint-Denis, C-166/13

Leto: 2014
Organ: Sodišče Evropske unije

Sodba pojasnjuje razmerje med 41. členom Listine in splošnim načelom spoštovanja pravic obrambe. Sodišče je ugotovilo, da je 41. člen neposredno naslovljen na institucije in organe EU, ne pa na države članice. Kljub temu morajo države članice pri izvajanju prava EU spoštovati pravico do izjave kot splošno načelo prava EU. Sodba določa, da mora imeti prizadeta oseba učinkovito možnost predstaviti svoje stališče pred sprejetjem neugodnega ukrepa. Za Kodeks je pomembna tudi zahteva, da organ pripombe skrbno in nepristransko preuči ter odločitev konkretno obrazloži.

(6) Sodba Sodišča EU v zadevi Berlioz Investment Fund SA proti Directeur de l’administration des contributions directes, C-682/15

Leto: 2017
Organ: Sodišče Evropske unije, veliki senat

Sodba se neposredno nanaša na upravno sodelovanje držav članic na področju obdavčevanja. Sodišče je presojalo uporabo 51. člena Listine in pravico do učinkovitega pravnega sredstva iz 47. člena. Ugotovilo je, da mora imeti sankcionirana oseba možnost sodnega nadzora nad zakonitostjo zahteve po informacijah, na kateri temelji sankcija. Sodba kaže, da učinkovitost davčnega sodelovanja ne izključuje nadzora nad pravno in dejansko podlago ukrepa. Za Kodeks je pomembna kot opozorilo, da evropski davčni mehanizem ne sme ustvariti zavezujočih posledic brez dostopnega in učinkovitega pravnega varstva.

(7) Glej sklep in sporočilo Sveta o reformi Kodeksa iz leta 2022;

(8) Glej odločbo Komisije o belgijskih koordinacijskih centrih;

(9) Glej odločbo Komisije o nizozemskem režimu mednarodnega financiranja;

(10) Glej odločbo Komisije o luksemburških holdingih iz leta 1929;

(11) Glej odločitev o izvolitvi Tine Humar.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FROM HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION TO ETHICAL TAX SYSTEMS IN THE EU-27

A Critical Analysis of the Code of Conduct from the Perspective of Good Administration, Human Rights, and Articles 41 and 51 of the EU Charter

Tina Humar’s Chairmanship as an Opportunity for a European Forum on Fair Tax Systems and a Directive on Taxpayer Rights

Author: mag. Franc Derganc, www.modro-poslovanje.si; the analytical part was prepared by “AI TAXIN” – an AI agent specialising in tax law

I. INTRODUCTION

1. THE CODE HAS NOT REMAINED A MERE POLITICAL DECLARATION: THREE CONCRETE RESULTS

The Code of Conduct for Business Taxation is a political and intergovernmental commitment by the Member States of the European Union aimed at identifying, assessing and eliminating tax measures that may cause harmful tax competition or reduce the tax bases of other countries.

The original Code was adopted by the Council of the European Union and the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, by a resolution of 1 December 1997. It was published on 6 January 1998 in Official Journal of the European Communities C 2, pages 2 to 5; the official text of the original Code is available on EUR-Lex. On 8 November 2022, the Council approved the first comprehensive revision of the Code since 1997, extending the scope of the assessment from preferential tax regimes to certain tax features of general application within national tax systems. The revised text was published on 15 November 2022 in Official Journal of the European Union C 433, pages 1 to 5; the official Slovenian version of the revised Code is available on EUR-Lex. The revised Code replaced the original Code on 1 January 2023, while the rules relating to tax features of general application have applied since 1 January 2024.

The revised Code of Conduct for Business Taxation is a political and intergovernmental instrument, but its importance should not be underestimated.

The Council of the EU states that approximately 140 harmful tax practices have been eliminated in the European Union since the mechanism began operating. (7) From a legal perspective, it would not be correct to attribute all these results exclusively to the European Commission. The Code of Conduct Group identifies and assesses measures, the Commission prepares technical analyses, the Member States adopt political conclusions, and national legislatures must then amend their respective rules. In several of the most important cases, the Commission reinforced the Group’s political findings by applying binding EU State aid rules. It was precisely this link between the soft law of the Code and the Commission’s legally binding powers that enabled political assessments to be converted into concrete results.

1.1 Belgian coordination centres

Since 1982, Belgium had applied a special tax regime for coordination centres of international groups that performed financial, management and support functions for related companies. The Code of Conduct Group classified the Belgian regime as harmful tax measure A 001, after which the Commission also examined it under the State aid rules. (8)

On 17 February 2003, the Commission concluded that the regime granted selective tax advantages to coordination centres and constituted State aid incompatible with the common market. Belgium was required to abolish or amend the regime so as to bring it into conformity with EU law.

Following notification of the decision, the advantages could no longer be granted to new beneficiaries or maintained by extending existing authorisations. In order to protect legitimate expectations, existing beneficiaries were permitted to continue using the regime only until the expiry of their individual authorisations and, in any event, no later than 31 December 2010. (8)

The result was the gradual termination of one of Europe’s most prominent preferential regimes for the activities of international groups. At the same time, the case demonstrates that the Commission did not achieve the result through the Code alone, but primarily through the combination of the Group’s political assessment and the Commission’s binding powers in the field of State aid.

1.2 The Netherlands regime for international financing activities

The Netherlands regime for international financing activities enabled certain companies within international groups to establish a special risk reserve into which up to 80 per cent of profits from financing activities could be transferred.

The regime was primarily available to groups operating in at least four countries or on at least two continents, meaning that the benefit was not generally available to all companies. The Commission found that the regime enabled an immediate and substantial reduction in the tax burden, because amounts transferred to the reserve were taxed at a later stage, at a lower rate or, in certain circumstances, not at all.

The Code of Conduct Group had previously classified the measure as harmful measure B 004. (9) On 17 February 2003, the Commission decided that the Netherlands had unlawfully implemented the regime and that it constituted State aid incompatible with the common market.

The Netherlands was required to terminate the regime. In order to protect legitimate expectations, existing beneficiaries were granted a limited transitional period, but in no event beyond 31 December 2010. The Netherlands had already stopped accepting new applications for admission to the regime in December 2002. (9)

The practical result was the closure of a special system that had enabled international groups to obtain substantial tax deferral in connection with the financing of related companies. The case is also important because the Commission rejected the argument that a selective tax advantage could be justified merely because it prevented the relocation of capital or attracted financing activities to the country.

1.3 Luxembourg holding companies established under the 1929 legislation

For decades, the Luxembourg regime for so-called 1929 holding companies provided special tax treatment for companies whose principal activity consisted of managing financial investments and shareholdings.

According to the information contained in the Commission decision, almost 13,000 exempt holding companies operated in Luxembourg. The regime was therefore not a marginal exception, but a significant component of Luxembourg’s financial model.

When initiating the procedure, the Commission expressly relied, among other considerations, on the Code of Conduct, which had been adopted to restrict harmful tax competition. In July 2006, it concluded that the tax regime for exempt holding companies constituted State aid incompatible with the common market.

Luxembourg was required to abolish or amend the regime by 31 December 2006 at the latest. From the date of notification of the decision, no new beneficiaries could be admitted, while existing companies were permitted to continue benefiting from the regime only during a transitional period ending in 2010.

The Commission allowed the transitional period in view of the economic consequences, the position of employees and the legitimate expectations of existing companies, while also imposing restrictions on transfers of their capital. (10)

The result was the abolition of one of Europe’s oldest and most significant regimes for tax-exempt financial holding companies. This case likewise confirms that the Code may politically identify a problem, but that an actual legal change is usually secured only through the application of binding EU rules or through the willingness of the relevant Member State to amend its legislation.

Why this article now?

The debate concerning the legal nature, achievements and shortcomings of the Code has become particularly relevant for Slovenia because Tina Humar was elected Chair of the Code of Conduct Group on 21 May 2026 for a two-year term.

Tina Humar is Director-General of the Directorate for the System of Tax, Customs and Other Public Revenues at the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Slovenia. The Chair does not decide independently whether a particular tax measure is harmful, but she has an important role in steering the Group’s work, shaping its agenda, facilitating consensus among the Member States and engaging with third-country jurisdictions.

In its external work, the Chair is supported by the General Secretariat of the Council and by the European Commission, which provides technical assistance. (11)

The Slovenian chairmanship therefore provides an opportunity to address not only the continued elimination of harmful tax practices, but also the quality of the underlying analyses, transparency of decision-making, measurability of results and protection of fundamental rights.

This article is not intended as criticism of the Chair or of Slovenia. Its purpose is to contribute to a professional debate on how the Group could become more effective, more transparent and more consistent with the principles of good administration during the next two years.

II. CORE ANALYSIS

Abstract

The revised Code of Conduct for Business Taxation is an important European Union instrument for identifying and eliminating harmful tax measures. Its distinctive feature is that it is not formally a binding act of EU law, but a political commitment undertaken by the Member States.

Nevertheless, assessments adopted within the Code of Conduct Group may result in amendments to national legislation, the termination of tax advantages and significant economic consequences for companies.

The fundamental question is therefore not only whether the Code effectively prevents harmful tax competition, but also whether its procedures comply with the requirements of the rule of law and fundamental rights.

Articles 41 and 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are particularly relevant. Article 41 guarantees the right to good administration, while Article 51 determines the Charter’s field of application.

The analysis shows that the Code contains an important technical component, but that final decision-making remains political and the procedural rights of directly affected persons are not adequately regulated.

1. The Code as a political commitment with practical legal effects

In 2022, the Council of the European Union and the representatives of the governments of the Member States adopted the revised Code of Conduct for Business Taxation.

The document expressly states that the Code is a political commitment and that it does not alter the rights and obligations of the Member States or the allocation of competences between the European Union and the Member States. At the same time, it defines the Code of Conduct Group as a peer-review group of the Member States operating with the indispensable assistance of the European Commission. (1)

The Code is therefore not a regulation, directive or decision within the meaning of Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. As a rule, its provisions cannot be directly enforced before national courts in the same manner as binding EU law.

Formal non-binding status does not, however, mean that the Code is devoid of legal and economic effects.

Through the Code, the Member States politically commit themselves not to introduce new harmful tax measures and to amend or abolish existing harmful measures. A negative assessment of a tax regime may therefore lead to an amendment of national legislation, the termination of a tax advantage, changes in investment decisions and interference with companies’ business models.

In relation to third countries, findings of the Group may contribute to the inclusion of a jurisdiction on the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes. (1)

The Code is therefore a typical example of soft law that lacks conventional legal binding force but may nevertheless produce relatively hard consequences.

It is precisely this divergence between its formal nature and practical effects that creates the central problem of legal protection. A political document may become the decisive basis for a subsequent legislative or administrative measure, even though the initial procedure is not subject to the same procedural rules as a formal administrative or legislative procedure.

2. A legitimate objective and a limited understanding of tax fairness

The objective of the Code is legitimate. It is intended to restrict tax measures that may significantly affect the location of business activity, cause erosion of the tax base, permit double non-taxation or allow the same tax benefit to be used more than once.

The revised Code no longer covers only preferential tax regimes, but also certain features of general application within national tax systems.

A preferential measure is regarded as potentially harmful where it provides for a significantly lower effective level of taxation than that generally applicable in the relevant Member State. The assessment takes particular account of whether the benefit is restricted to non-residents, whether genuine economic activity is absent, whether the rules depart from internationally accepted profit-allocation principles and whether transparency is lacking. (1)

The Code does not, however, interpret the concept of fair taxation comprehensively. Its central concern is not whether a tax system is fair towards the taxpayer, but how a national measure affects the tax bases, economic activity and interests of other countries.

As a rule, the Code does not examine whether a national tax is proportionate, whether it protects an economic minimum, whether it respects taxpayers’ legitimate expectations or whether the national tax administration provides effective legal protection.

Nor does it examine the overall distribution of tax burdens between labour, consumption and capital. The expression “fair tax competition” is therefore substantively narrower than the concept of a fair tax system.

3. Who establishes the facts?

The procedure begins with notification of a tax measure. The Member States inform one another of existing and proposed measures that may fall within the scope of the Code. A non-notified measure may also be brought to the Group’s attention by another Member State or by the European Commission.

An “agreed description” of the measure may then be prepared. The Member States decide whether the procedure should continue and whether such a description should be drawn up. Only on the basis of the agreed description is it assessed whether the tax measure is harmful. (1)

The concept of an agreed description is practical, but legally problematic. The facts are not necessarily the result of an independent evidentiary procedure, but of an agreement between representatives of the Member States.

The Code does not establish a clear burden of proof, standard of proof or procedure for cases in which the Member State concerned and the Commission disagree on material facts.

Particular attention should be drawn to the provision under which the Group is to examine the economic factors and impact data “brought to its attention”.

Such wording does not create a clear obligation on the Group or the Commission to establish, of their own motion, a complete and materially accurate factual record. Nor does the Code require a counterfactual analysis that would assess what would happen to investment, employment or tax revenue in the absence of the measure concerned. (1)

The European Commission has an important technical role in this process. On the basis of information provided by the Member States, it prepares draft descriptions and draft assessments.

The Commission does not, however, participate in the Group’s decision-making. The results are endorsed by representatives of the Member States and submitted to the Council for approval. (1)

The institutional model is therefore clear: the Commission provides the technical basis, while the Member States take the political decision.

4. The Member States as both subjects of assessment and decision-makers

The 1998 conclusions establishing the Group already provided that its purpose was to assess tax measures that might fall within the scope of the Code and to oversee the provision of information on those measures. (2)

The same document expressly emphasised the political importance of the Group’s work. For that reason, the Member States and the Commission appoint high-level representatives. (2)

The Group is therefore not an independent European tax regulator or an expert adjudicative body.

The Member States are simultaneously the legislators of their own tax regimes, the providers of information concerning those regimes, the assessors of other Member States’ measures and the final decision-makers in the peer-review process.

Such a peer-review system may encourage political cooperation, but it also entails a structural risk of reciprocal compromise.

A Member State may be reluctant to assess another country’s regime strictly because it wishes to secure similarly favourable treatment for its own regime at a later stage. The final assessment is therefore not necessarily the result solely of a technical application of objective criteria, but may also reflect national interests and political negotiation.

The Code does not contain rules requiring the recusal of a national representative, regulating conflicts of interest or providing for independent external validation of the analysis.

Nor does it require publication of the position taken by each Member State or of the manner in which the decision was reached. These deficiencies make it more difficult to assess impartiality and equal treatment of comparable tax regimes.

5. Transparency of the final result, but not necessarily of the process

The Code expresses the objective of applying its provisions as transparently as possible, while at the same time protecting the confidentiality considered necessary for the exchange of sensitive information.

Final documents approved by the Council are published, whereas additional documents are made public only where appropriate and in accordance with the rules on access to documents. (1)

The public may therefore see the final assessment, but not necessarily the complete analytical and political process that led to it.

It is generally not fully apparent which data were submitted by the Member State, what additional information was requested by the Commission, how the draft assessment changed, which Member State opposed the findings or what political compromises influenced the final outcome.

Confidentiality may be legitimate for the protection of tax secrecy, business secrets and international relations.

However, confidentiality should not also extend to the methodology, the reasons for the decision and positions that do not disclose protected information. Under the present framework, there is a risk that protection of sensitive information may be used as a broader justification for a lack of transparency in political decision-making.

6. Effects of the Code on human rights

The Code contains no dedicated chapter concerning human or fundamental rights.

It does not regulate the right of an affected company to be heard, to obtain access to the file, to receive a reasoned decision or to have an effective remedy.

Nor does it establish a specific procedure for the protection of business secrets, personal data or the legitimate expectations of beneficiaries of tax regimes.

This does not mean that the Code has only negative effects. Restricting harmful regimes may protect tax revenues and contribute to a more balanced distribution of tax burdens.

Where highly mobile companies pay disproportionately little tax because of special regimes, the resulting shortfall often has to be compensated for by less mobile taxpayers, employees, consumers and small and medium-sized enterprises.

Protection of the tax base may therefore indirectly contribute to the financing of healthcare, education, social security and other public services.

However, this positive effect is not systematically measured within the framework of the Code from the perspective of social and human rights. The Code primarily assesses the impact on tax competition, rather than the overall societal effect of a particular measure.

7. Article 51 of the Charter: when do fundamental rights apply?

Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that the Charter applies to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.

It applies to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. At the same time, the Charter does not extend the competences of the EU or create any new competences. (3)

In the context of the Code, this raises the question of attribution of individual acts.

Representatives of the Member States and the Commission participate in the Group, the Commission prepares the technical basis, the Member States endorse the results, and the final documents are approved by the Council.

When the Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council or the Council acts as an EU institution, it is bound by the Charter.

The political or non-binding nature of a document does not in itself mean that an EU institution may operate outside the requirements of fundamental rights.

The position is more complex where representatives of the governments of the Member States act in an intergovernmental rather than a strictly institutional capacity.

A further question arises where a Member State amends its national legislation following a negative assessment.

Where the amendment is merely a consequence of a political commitment under the Code, it is not automatically clear that the State is “implementing Union law” within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter.

Where the national measure also implements an EU directive, a Commission State aid decision or another binding act of EU law, the Charter applies.

In Åkerberg Fransson, the Court of Justice clarified that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter apply in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations. Where national legislation falls within the scope of EU law, the fundamental rights contained in the Charter are also applicable. (4)

An important consequence follows from this principle.

The Code must not create an area in which the decisive political assessment is carried out at European level, while its legal consequences are formally attributed only to the national legislature, with the result that application of the Charter is said to be excluded.

The assessment must take account of the actual substantive connection between the national measure and EU law, rather than merely the formal classification of the document as a political commitment.

8. Article 41 of the Charter and the right to good administration

Article 41 of the Charter provides that every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.

The right includes, in particular, the right to be heard before an adverse individual measure is taken, the right of access to the file and the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions. (3)

In Mukarubega, the Court of Justice explained that Article 41, according to its wording, is addressed directly to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU, and not to the authorities of the Member States.

At the same time, however, the Court emphasised that the right to be heard forms an integral part of the rights of the defence as a general principle of EU law. When a national authority adopts a measure within the scope of EU law, it must therefore respect the addressee’s right to present his or her position effectively. (5)

In relation to the Code, a distinction must be drawn between an abstract assessment of a tax regime and an individual measure directed against a particular company.

Formally, the Group assesses the tax rules of a Member State, not the individual tax liability of a particular taxpayer. It cannot therefore automatically be inferred from Article 41 that every user of a regime has the right to participate in the Group’s procedure.

The position is different where a regime is intended for only a very limited number of companies or where the assessment is based on data that directly identify an individual beneficiary.

The more individualised the company and the more directly the assessment affects its legal or economic position, the more difficult it becomes to treat the procedure as a wholly abstract political assessment.

The current Code does not give companies the right to be informed of the allegations, correct inaccurate information or respond to a draft negative assessment.

The Member State concerned participates in the procedure, but its interests are not necessarily identical to those of the company.

A Member State may accept a political compromise, abandon the defence of a regime or amend its legislation because of broader relations with other Member States.

Participation by the State cannot therefore always replace the directly affected person’s right to be heard.

9. Impartiality, access to the file and the duty to give reasons

The requirement of impartiality is particularly sensitive because the final decision is taken by representatives of the Member States.

The Code does not establish an independent expert panel, conflict-of-interest rules or a formal recusal procedure.

The Commission, which prepares the technical analysis, does not participate in the decision-making.

The right of access to the file must be balanced against the protection of tax secrecy and business and professional secrets. The solution, however, should not be complete denial of access to the material.

Possible safeguards include anonymisation, partial access, redaction of business secrets, confidential access by an authorised representative or preparation of a sufficiently detailed summary of the essential findings.

The Code also does not define a precise standard for the statement of reasons.

The final assessment should explain the facts established, the criteria applied, the economic effects, the treatment of opposing arguments and the reasons for distinguishing the measure from comparable regimes in other Member States.

Without such reasoning, it is not possible to assess effectively the impartiality, equal treatment and proportionality of the decision.

In Mukarubega, the Court of Justice emphasised that the authority must examine the relevant circumstances carefully and impartially and provide sufficiently specific reasons for its decision.

The right to be heard is not merely an opportunity to submit observations. It also entails an obligation on the authority genuinely to consider those observations. (5)

10. From the right to good administration to an effective remedy

Although this analysis focuses primarily on Articles 41 and 51 of the Charter, their application must also be considered in conjunction with Article 47, which guarantees the right to an effective remedy.

The Code does not establish a specific remedy against the agreed description, a negative assessment of a tax regime or a recommendation that the regime be abolished.

As a rule, an affected company may seek legal protection only at a later stage, for example against a national tax decision or national legislation, provided that the national legal order permits such review.

In Berlioz Investment Fund, the Court of Justice examined tax cooperation between the Member States and held that a person penalised for failing to comply with a request for information must be able to obtain effective judicial review of the legality of the request on which the penalty was based.

The case confirms that, where a European tax mechanism produces binding consequences for an individual, there must be judicial review of the legal and factual basis of the measure. (6)

This reasoning is also important for the Code.

Soft law cannot itself constitute a direct legal basis for a penalty or for the restriction of a fundamental right.

Where a political assessment is followed by legally binding obligations, those obligations must be based on a sufficiently clear legal act and the affected person must have access to effective judicial protection.

11. How should the Code be amended?

The Code should define more clearly who is responsible for establishing the facts and who is responsible for the final decision.

The current division, under which the Commission prepares a draft while the Member States decide politically, does not provide sufficiently clear accountability.

A public and uniform assessment methodology is required.

It should define the minimum data required, the burden and standard of proof, the method for calculating the effective level of taxation, the criteria for economic substance and the method for determining the impact on other Member States.

For significant regimes, the methodology should include a counterfactual analysis and independent technical verification of national data.

Affected companies should not necessarily be granted the status of a formal party in every procedure concerning a generally applicable tax measure.

There should, however, be a possibility of targeted participation where a company is directly identifiable, where its data are used or where the assessment is likely to result in a direct interference with its legal position.

The final document should contain the facts established, the criteria applied, the essential economic data, the position of the Member State concerned and a clear explanation of the final assessment.

Following an appropriate period of confidentiality, the positions of the Member States and the outcome of the decision-making process should also be published.

Finally, the Code should contain an express provision that its implementation must not prejudice the rights guaranteed by the Charter and that all subsequent binding measures must be subject to effective judicial review.

Conclusion

The revised Code of Conduct plays an important role in restricting harmful tax competition.

Its advantage is flexibility, since it enables political coordination in an area in which the Member States carefully protect their tax sovereignty.

However, that same flexibility is also its greatest weakness.

The Code is a political commitment with practical legal and economic consequences, but it does not establish a complete system of procedural rights, independent decision-making and effective remedies.

Article 51 of the Charter requires it to be determined, for each stage of the procedure, whether the conduct at issue constitutes the action of an EU institution or the implementation of EU law.

The hybrid institutional structure must not allow responsibility to be shifted between the Commission, the Council and representatives of the Member States.

Article 41 requires EU bodies to act impartially, fairly, within a reasonable time and on the basis of a sufficiently reasoned assessment.

Where the procedure directly affects an identifiable person, the right to be heard, access to essential documents and access to effective legal protection become particularly important.

The fundamental criticism of the Code therefore concerns not its objective, but its procedural architecture:

The Code seeks to ensure fair tax competition between States, but it does not yet provide sufficiently clearly for a fair procedure for the persons who are actually affected by its findings.

III. IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: A SLOVENIAN OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP ETHICAL TAX SYSTEMS IN THE EU-27

A critical analysis of the Code should not end merely with the conclusion that the Code of Conduct Group operates as a political intergovernmental mechanism with limited procedural safeguards.

As a result of Tina Humar’s two-year chairmanship, Slovenia has an opportunity to direct the debate towards possible solutions.

Tina Humar was elected Chair on 21 May 2026 and her term of office is two years.

The Chair cannot unilaterally amend the Code or extend the Group’s competences, but she may significantly influence its work programme, the formulation of its agenda, the preparation of expert discussions and the search for consensus among the Member States.

The Group’s current mandate is primarily directed towards identifying harmful tax measures, ensuring fair tax competition and assessing tax features that affect the location of business activity.

The Group cannot therefore become a European constitutional court for tax matters.

It could, however, begin systematically considering whether the tax systems of the Member States provide, in addition to preventing harmful competition, minimum standards of the rule of law, good administration and equal treatment of taxpayers.

1. A proposal to develop the Group into a forum for ethical tax systems in the EU-27

The first proposal is that Tina Humar should, during her term of office, promote the establishment of a special subgroup or permanent expert forum for ethical, constitutionally sustainable and administratively fair tax systems in the EU-27.

The Chair could not establish such a forum unilaterally.

However, the 1998 conclusions establishing the Group already provide that, subject to the formal agreement of the Council, one or more subgroups may be established to consider particular issues.

This provides a sufficient institutional basis for the Chair to propose to the Member States that the work programme be extended and a specific mandate be prepared.

The purpose of the new forum would not be to set uniform tax rates or interfere with the tax sovereignty of the Member States.

Its task would be to formulate common criteria for determining whether a particular tax system guarantees a minimum level of fairness, predictability and effective legal protection.

An ethical tax system is not necessarily a system with either low or high taxes.

It is a system in which tax obligations are laid down by sufficiently clear legislation, comparable taxpayers are treated comparably, and State interference is necessary, appropriate and proportionate.

A taxpayer must be able to understand his or her obligations in advance, have an opportunity to participate in the procedure, receive a reasoned decision within a reasonable period and have access to an effective and timely remedy.

Such a forum could prepare a European Tax System Fairness Matrix.

The assessment would not be limited to whether a State uses a particular regime to attract profits from other States, but would also cover the quality of tax legislation and tax procedures.

The criteria would include legality, equality, legal certainty, proportionality, protection of legitimate expectations, the right to be heard, the right of access to the file, adequate reasoning of decisions, duration of proceedings and effectiveness of judicial protection.

The position of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises should form a specific area of assessment.

SMEs generally do not have in-house tax departments, international advisory networks or the financial resources available to large groups.

For such enterprises, the complexity of legislation, frequent amendments, lengthy procedures and disproportionate documentation requirements may in themselves constitute an effective restriction on the freedom to conduct a business.

For every significant European or national tax measure, the forum should therefore also carry out an SME fairness test.

The assessment should examine not only how much tax revenue a measure is expected to produce, but also how much time, external professional assistance and information-system adaptation it will require from an average micro or small enterprise.

A measure whose compliance costs are disproportionate to the relevant tax risk cannot be considered fully fair, even if it formally applies equally to all undertakings.

The forum should also address the position of natural persons, particularly persons with low incomes, persons with disabilities, older people, cross-border workers and persons who are unable to use digital services effectively.

A formally identical digital obligation may create substantive inequality where an individual lacks the necessary knowledge, equipment or access to professional assistance.

In 2016, the Commission already prepared guidelines for a model European Taxpayers’ Code.

The objective was to improve cooperation, trust and transparency between tax administrations and taxpayers.

However, the European Taxpayers’ Code remained a non-binding model of conduct and does not create directly enforceable rights.

The task of the new forum would therefore be to develop that document further.

Instead of general recommendations, it should prepare measurable standards, procedural time limits and indicators against which all 27 Member States could be compared.

In its analytical work, the forum should not rely solely on self-reporting by the Member States.

Together with independent research institutions, universities, taxpayer organisations, SME representatives and professional associations, the Commission should prepare verifiable analyses.

The Commission already operates the Platform for Tax Good Governance, which includes tax experts and representatives of business and civil society. An institutional model for incorporating external expertise therefore already exists.

One result of Tina Humar’s term of office could be the first document entitled:

European Principles of an Ethical Tax System and Good Administration of Taxes and Other Public Levies in the EU-27.

Initially, the document could take the form of a recommendation or Council conclusions.

Its long-term objective, however, should be the preparation of binding minimum rules governing tax procedures and the rights of persons liable for taxes and other compulsory public charges.

2. What should ETAF propose?

ETAF – the European Tax Adviser Federation – should use the Slovenian chairmanship of the Group as an opportunity to submit to the Council a professionally developed model for a European legislative initiative.

In 2018, ETAF adopted the Charter of Regulated European Tax Advisers.

The Charter emphasises professional diligence, independence, objectivity, continuing professional education, confidentiality and the quality of tax advice.

ETAF subsequently also called for clearer European protection of tax advisers’ professional confidentiality and pointed out that differences in national regulation result in unequal protection of clients and unequal competitive conditions.

The next logical step should therefore not be limited to defending the professional status of tax advisers.

ETAF should proceed from the rights of clients and propose a European system in which high-quality, independent and confidential tax advice is recognised as one of the conditions for the effective exercise of taxpayer rights.

A right set out in legislation or in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union often has little practical value for an individual or small enterprise if that person cannot identify a violation, prepare evidence, understand a tax calculation or use a legal remedy effectively.

An ethical tax intermediary is therefore not merely a private service provider.

Such an intermediary forms an important part of the infrastructure of the rule of law, enabling taxpayers to understand their obligations and exercise their rights.

This does not mean that the State should be permitted to transfer its own responsibilities to tax advisers.

Primary responsibility for a lawful, comprehensible and fair procedure must always remain with the tax administration.

A tax adviser should constitute an additional safeguard, not a substitute for good administration.

ETAF should therefore prepare a model:

PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON MINIMUM STANDARDS OF GOOD TAX ADMINISTRATION, TAXPAYER RIGHTS AND ETHICAL TAX INTERMEDIATION

Neither ETAF nor the Chair of the Group may formally submit a legislative proposal.

As a general rule, the right of legislative initiative belongs to the European Commission.

However, under Article 241 TFEU, the Council may, acting by a simple majority, request the Commission to undertake any studies considered desirable and to submit an appropriate proposal. Where the Commission does not submit a proposal, it must inform the Council of its reasons.

Within the Group, Tina Humar could therefore promote the adoption of conclusions under which the Council would invite the Commission to prepare an impact assessment and a legislative proposal.

Her role would primarily consist of building expert and political consensus, rather than directly drafting or adopting the directive.

2.1 Legal limitation: a single directive cannot easily cover every category of public levy

The proposal must be prepared with legal precision.

Article 114 TFEU, which allows the approximation of internal-market rules under the ordinary legislative procedure, does not apply to fiscal provisions.

For direct taxation, the principal legal basis would be Article 115 TFEU, under which the Council unanimously adopts directives for the approximation of national provisions that directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market.

For VAT, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation, Article 113 TFEU would apply. That provision also requires unanimity in the Council.

Article 197 TFEU may support the exchange of information, training and development of the administrative capacity of the Member States, but expressly excludes harmonisation of national laws and regulations.

It would therefore not, in itself, be a sufficient basis for creating enforceable taxpayer rights.

The legally safest solution would be a European legislative package.

The first directive would regulate minimum standards in the field of taxation on the basis of Articles 113 and 115 TFEU.

For other public levies, social contributions and compulsory payments, the appropriate sectoral legal bases would have to be used, or Member States could be encouraged to extend the rules of the directive voluntarily to the broader field of compulsory public charges.

2.2 Proposed core provisions of the directive

Article 1 – Subject matter and purpose

This Directive establishes minimum standards of good tax administration, procedural rights of taxpayers and conditions for high-quality, independent and ethical tax advice in the European Union.

The purpose of the Directive is to ensure an equivalent minimum level of protection for natural persons and undertakings in tax procedures, particularly in matters affecting the internal market or having a connection with European Union law.

Article 2 – Fundamental principles

Member States shall ensure that tax obligations are determined and enforced in accordance with the principles of legality, equality, legal certainty, proportionality, protection of legitimate expectations, good administration and effective legal protection.

When selecting a measure, the tax authority shall apply the lawful measure that, while equally effective, interferes least with the rights of the taxpayer.

Article 3 – Right to good tax administration

Every taxpayer shall have the right to have his or her affairs handled by the tax authority impartially, professionally, fairly and within a reasonable time.

Before a measure that may adversely affect the taxpayer’s position is adopted, the taxpayer shall have the opportunity to be informed of the essential facts, evidence and legal assessment and to submit observations.

The final decision shall state reasons sufficient to enable review of the facts established, the application of the law and the proportionality of the measure.

Article 4 – Access to the file and protection of confidential information

The taxpayer and his or her authorised representative shall have the right of access to the documents and information on which the decision is based.

Access may be restricted only to the extent that is necessary and proportionate for the protection of personal data, tax secrecy, business secrets or the rights of third parties.

Even where access is restricted, the authority shall provide a sufficiently detailed summary of the essential facts and reasons to enable the effective exercise of the rights of the defence.

Article 5 – Effective remedy

The taxpayer shall have the right to an effective and timely administrative and judicial remedy.

The immediate enforceability of a tax liability shall not cause irreparable harm or endanger the economic minimum of an individual or the continued operation of an undertaking where the taxpayer’s claim is manifestly well founded or where enforcement would be disproportionate.

Article 6 – Special protection for SMEs and vulnerable persons

When establishing reporting, documentation and digital obligations, Member States shall take account of the size, economic capacity and actual administrative resources of the taxpayer.

Micro and small enterprises shall not be subject to obligations whose costs are manifestly disproportionate to the relevant tax risk.

Vulnerable natural persons and micro-enterprises shall have access to free or publicly supported basic tax assistance.

Article 7 – Right to independent tax advice

Every person shall have the right to be represented in a tax procedure by a suitably qualified and independent tax adviser.

Member States shall ensure transparent rules governing professional qualifications, liability, continuing education and quality supervision of tax intermediaries, without unjustifiably restricting the free movement of services.

Article 8 – Ethical standard for tax intermediaries

A tax intermediary shall act professionally, independently and objectively and in the lawful interests of the client.

The intermediary shall inform the client of the relevant facts, legal options, risks and consequences of the proposed conduct.

The intermediary shall not participate in tax evasion, falsification of evidence, concealment of the true facts or any other unlawful activity.

At the same time, the intermediary shall not be required to disclose confidential communications arising in the course of lawful legal or tax advice unless clear, legally prescribed and proportionate conditions are satisfied.

Article 9 – Professional confidentiality as a right of the client

Professional confidentiality shall not constitute a personal privilege of the tax adviser, but a safeguard protecting the client and the client’s trust in legal advice.

Protection shall depend on the substance of the service, not solely on the national professional title of the adviser.

Equivalent confidential tax-law advice shall receive equivalent protection where it is provided by an independent professional who is legally bound by duties of confidentiality, professional responsibility and supervision.

Article 10 – Independent supervision and reporting

Member States shall establish an independent procedure for addressing systemic violations of taxpayer rights.

They shall report annually to the Commission on the duration of procedures, the number of decisions annulled, the effectiveness of legal remedies, compliance costs for SMEs and measures adopted to improve the quality of tax administration.

2.3 Extending the principle underlying Article 41 of the Charter to all persons liable for taxes and other public charges

The central ambition of the Directive would be to translate the substantive principle underlying Article 41 of the Charter into the everyday relationship between national tax authorities and taxpayers.

Article 41 is addressed directly to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the EU.

Because of the limitation contained in Article 51 of the Charter, Article 41 cannot automatically be relied upon as a directly enforceable right against a national authority in every purely domestic tax procedure.

This is precisely why the Directive would be important.

What currently depends, under Article 51, on whether the Member State is implementing EU law would become, within the scope of the Directive, a clearly defined right under national law.

The objective would not be to extend the competences of the EU beyond the Treaties.

The objective would be to establish, within the limits of existing competences, a minimum European standard under which no individual and no undertaking may be treated merely as an object for the collection of public revenue.

The taxpayer must be a subject of the procedure, entitled to know why payment is required, on which facts the decision is based, who made the decision, within what period the matter will be determined and how the taxpayer may effectively protect his or her rights.

Without independent, professionally qualified and ethically accountable tax intermediaries, such a system will be difficult to implement in practice.

However, such intermediaries must form part of the system protecting the client, rather than acting as an extension of the tax administration or as an industry engaged in designing aggressive tax products.

The common European formula should therefore be:

good tax legislation, good tax administration, effective legal protection and ethical tax intermediaries.

If Tina Humar were able, during her two-year term, to initiate a debate on such a model and secure the support of the Member States for the preparation of a European legislative initiative, the Slovenian chairmanship of the Group would go beyond the administrative management of the existing Code.

It could become the starting point for the development of a European tax-system model that protects not only the tax bases of States, but also the dignity, legal certainty and equal status of the individuals and undertakings that pay those taxes.

SOURCES

(1) Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the Member States on a revised Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, 2022/C 433/01

Year: 2022
Institution: Council of the European Union and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council

This document is the principal subject of the article because it lays down the current mandate, substantive criteria and procedure for assessing harmful tax measures. It establishes that the Code is a political commitment rather than a conventional binding act of EU law. It regulates the preparation of the agreed description, the role of the European Commission and final decision-making by representatives of the Member States. It is also important because it reveals the tension between declared transparency and the protection of confidentiality. It therefore provides the basis for assessing whether the procedure contains adequate institutional and procedural safeguards.

(2) Council conclusions of 9 March 1998 concerning the establishment of the Code of Conduct Group for Business Taxation, 98/C 99/01

Year: 1998
Institution: Council of the European Union

The document constitutes the founding basis of the Code of Conduct Group. It shows that the Group was established to assess tax measures and oversee the provision of information. Of particular importance is the express statement that the Group’s work has political significance. The document also provides for high-level representatives of the Member States and the confidentiality of the Group’s work. It therefore confirms that the Group was not originally designed as an independent regulatory or judicial body.

(3) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular Articles 41 and 51

Year: 2012 – consolidated publication in the Official Journal of the European Union
Institution: European Union

Article 41 sets out the core of the right to good administration, including impartiality, fair treatment, decision-making within a reasonable time, the right to be heard, access to the file and the duty to give reasons. Article 51 provides that the Charter binds the EU institutions and the Member States when they are implementing EU law. This provision is essential for assessing the hybrid operation of the Group, in which the EU institutions and representatives of the Member States participate. At the same time, it prevents the Charter itself from creating new EU competences in the field of taxation. Taken together, the two Articles make it possible to assess who is responsible for respecting procedural rights within the process.

(4) Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10

Year: 2013
Institution: Court of Justice of the European Union, Grand Chamber

The judgment is a central authority for the interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter. The Court explained that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter apply in all situations governed by EU law. At the same time, it stressed that the Charter does not apply outside the scope of EU law. The judgment is relevant to this article because it demonstrates that the formal legal form of a national measure is not decisive; its substantive connection with EU law must also be considered. This criterion is crucial when assessing national measures adopted as a result of assessments or political pressure under the Code.

(5) Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Sophie Mukarubega v Préfet de police and Préfet de la Seine-Saint-Denis, C-166/13

Year: 2014
Institution: Court of Justice of the European Union

The judgment clarifies the relationship between Article 41 of the Charter and the general principle of respect for the rights of the defence. The Court held that Article 41 is addressed directly to the institutions and bodies of the EU, rather than to the Member States. Nevertheless, when implementing EU law, the Member States must respect the right to be heard as a general principle of EU law. The judgment establishes that the affected person must have an effective opportunity to present his or her position before an adverse measure is adopted. It is also relevant to the Code because it requires authorities to examine observations carefully and impartially and to give specific reasons for their decisions.

(6) Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Berlioz Investment Fund SA v Directeur de l’administration des contributions directes, C-682/15

Year: 2017
Institution: Court of Justice of the European Union, Grand Chamber

The judgment directly concerns administrative cooperation between Member States in the field of taxation. The Court considered the application of Article 51 of the Charter and the right to an effective remedy under Article 47. It held that a person on whom a penalty has been imposed must be able to obtain judicial review of the legality of the request for information on which the penalty is based. The judgment demonstrates that effective tax cooperation does not exclude review of the legal and factual basis of a measure. For the purposes of the Code, it is important as a warning that a European tax mechanism must not produce binding consequences without accessible and effective legal protection.

(7)

See the Council conclusions and press release concerning the 2022 reform of the Code.

(8)

See the Commission decision concerning Belgian coordination centres.

(9)

See the Commission decision concerning the Netherlands regime for international financing activities.

(10)

See the Commission decision concerning Luxembourg holding companies established under the 1929 legislation.

(11)

See the decision concerning the election of Tina Humar as Chair.